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SANTA CLARA LAWYER
immunity, courts have held that the employer's tort immunity does
not extend to an insurer where its negligence contributes directly
to the injury rather than aggravating it. 7
CONCLUSION
The ultimate conclusion must be that the court's interpretation
of sections 3852 and 3850 has, in effect, placed the workmen's com-
pensation carrier in an invulnerable position insofar as undertakings
it might assume which are not directly involved in the insurance pro-
cess. The traditional public policy argument must certainly falter
when ramifications of this problem come before the courts in the
future. Most importantly, it will be interesting to see how the court
will answer these two questions: (1) Will an insurer acting as an in-
spector still be immune from a common law suit when it fails to
carry out this duty in a grossly negligent manner?2 (2) What other
collateral undertakings can a carrier assume, for consideration,
from which he will be deemed immune because of the court's deci-
sion in this case?
In the opinion of the present writer, it seems that the court has
opened up a Pandora's box of problems by extending the employer's
immunity to apply to instances where the insurer is acting in a
capacity other than that of insurer.
Grace M. Kubota
THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT
AND THE SEEGER DECISION:
UNITED STATES v. SEEGER (U.S. 1965)
In keeping with our country's respect for freedom of religion,
persons whose religious beliefs prevent their participation in war
have always been exempt from military service.' The exemption is
Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361, 93 A.L.R.2d
591 (1963); Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564
(1960).
27 See 51 VA. L. Rav. 347 (1965).
28 The Hazelwerdt and Noe cases, supra note 24, stated that although an employer
and insurer are immune from suit for a physician's aggravation of a compensable
injury, the physician still may be liable to the injured party in a malpractice suit.
Using similar reasoning, it may be well argued that the insurer-inspector is liable
apart from the immunity extended by workmen's conpensation insurance in cases of
gross negligence.
1 The First Continental Congress passed a resolution granting protection to
those who could not bear arms because of "religious principles." See 2 Journals of
the Continental Congress 189 (1905). The first Federal Draft Act resulting from
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not based on any Constitutional guarantee, but on a grant of grace
by Congress. As such, it is under the control of Congress with
regard to the class of persons to whom it extends.2
During World War I a conscientious objector had to show
membership in an historic peace church to receive exemption.' The
test was simple and the courts and draft boards had little difficulty
applying it. However, this test permitted discrimination against those
conscientious objectors who were members of less prominent faiths,
since these were not "historic peace churches."4 To clarify the
situation, the Draft Act of 1940 granted exemption to persons who
were, "by reason of religious training and belief opposed to war
in any form."' To further clarify this phrase, the Draft Act of
19486 added language requiring that the conscientious objector's
belief be in relation to a "Supreme Being involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relationship ... "'
In the case of United States v. Seeger8 the United States Su-
preme Court defined "Supreme Being" as encompassing a broad
range of beliefs, thereby granting exemption to persons whose beliefs
were thought not to qualify under former interpretations.9 The
purpose of this note is to consider the effect of the Seeger decision
on members of the current Anti-War Movement, who might seek
exemption from military service as conscientious objectors."0
the Civil War also had a provision for persons religiously opposed to war. Act of
March 3, 1863, ch. 75 § 2, 12 Stat. 731; Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13 § 17, 13 Stat. 9.
2 Bousiden v. United States, 251 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927
(1958); Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); Bradshaw v. United
States, 242 F.2d 180 (10th Cir. 1953).
3 Act of May 18, 1917, Ch. 15 § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
4 See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
5 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
6 Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (Supp. III 1959), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 453-67
(Supp. IV, 1963).
7 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958). Hereinafter references will be to that section
unless otherwise indicated.
8 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Consolidated for argument with Seeger were United
States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), and Peter v. United States, 324
F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963).
9 E.g., Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
7.95 (1946). It was said of Berman, "his philosophy and morals and social policy
without the concept of deity cannot be said to be religion." Berman v. United States,
supra at 380-81. (Emphasis added.)
10 "Anti-War Movement" as used in this note refers generally to those persons
actively demonstrating their disapproval of United States foreign policy and, in
particular, United States involvement in Viet Nam. "Anti-War Movement" does not
refer to any particular organized group. Whether or not Seeger participated in such
activities does not affect the importance of the decision to those seeking exemption
as conscientious objectors.
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THE SEEGER CASE
In 1957 Seeger sought reclassification as a conscientious ob-jector. He had previously been classified 1-S, as a student. Professing
that this belief was a religious one, Seeger declared that he pre-
ferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open,
"rather than answer yes or no."" Seeger declared, "that his skep-
ticism or disbelief in the existence of God did not necessarily mean
a lack of faith in anything whatsoever";' 2 and "that his was a
belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes,
and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed."" Seeger further
stated that his was a belief in intellectual and moral integrity,
"without belief in God, except in the remotest sense."' 4 The local
and appeal boards of the Selective Service System denied Seeger's
claim, as not based upon a "belief in relation to a Supreme Being"
as required by section 6(j) of the Draft Act. 5
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
convicted Seeger of refusing to submit to induction into the armed
service.' The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, finding that
section 6(j) was an "impermissable classification" under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.' The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and in a unanimous decision, affirmed the
reversal of Seeger's conviction. The Supreme Court did not reach
the constitutional question however, because it found that Seeger's
beliefs were essentially religious and were based upon a Supreme
Being as required by section 6(j) of the Draft Act of 1948.
Thus the Supreme Court has defined the Supreme Being re-
quirement of the Draft Act as extending to beliefs other than those
based upon the traditional, orthodox God.'" Justice Clark, author
of the majority opinion, quoted from modern religious writers to
show that a narrow Supreme Being concept is at odds with present
religious philosophy. 0 The Court proposed a test to determine if
the registrant's belief is "religious in his scheme of things."2 0 Called
11 380 U.S. at 166.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (Supp. III 1959), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 453-67
(Supp. IV. 1963).
16 United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
17 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
18 This broad approach was first taken by Judge Augustus Hand's dictum inUnited States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). It was followed in United
States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1943).
19 380 U.S. at 180-83.
20 Id. at 185.
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the parallel belief test,2 it is: "[D]oes the claimed belief occupy
the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in
God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?" 22 The
Court considered this test to be objective and capable of application
by local boards, the examiner being furnished with "a standard that
permits consideration of criteria with which he has considerable
experience.""
THREE ELEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
The majority opinion in Seeger points out the three elements
which a draft board must look to when a registrant seeks exemption
as a conscientious objector. These are: (1) sincerity of belief;
(2) validity of belief; and (3) the importance of the belief in the
life of the claimant. The Court made it clear that the test of a
registrant's sincerity of belief is unchanged by the Seeger decision;
it remains the "prime consideration to the validity of every claim
for exemption as a conscientious objector."24 Regardless of the
nature of the belief professed, it must be found that the registrant
is sincere in his belief before the other aspects will be considered.
As provided in the Draft Act,25 the appeals board receives
assistance from the Department of Justice in answering the sub-
jective question of sincerity of belief. This department holds a
hearing and orders an investigation by the F.B.I.26 The Depart-
ment of Justice Hearing Officer considers the report of the F.B.I.
and the file of the registrant, including statements he has made to
the local and appeals boards. However, the factors given the greatest
weight are the registrant's manner of conducting himself before the
Hearing Officer, and his answers to the hypothetical questions asked
of him. This was pointed out in United States v. Simmons;
2 7
Probing a man's conscience is at best, a speculative venture. No one,
not even his closest friends and associates can testify to a certainty
as to what he believes and feels. These, at most, can only express their
opinion as to his sincerity. The best evidence on this question may
21 The test was first mentioned in Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions:
A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEO. L.J. 252 (1963).
22 380 U.S. at 184.
23 Id. at 183-84.
24 Id. at 185. See Bousiden v. United States, 251 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958). See generally 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25 (1957), and Smith &
Bell, The Conscientious Objector Program-A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. PITT. L.
REv. 695 (1958).
25 Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (Supp. III 1959), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 453-67
(Supp. IV. 1963).
26 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25 (1957).
27 213 F.2d 901 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 397 (1954).
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well be, not the man's statements or those of other witnesses, but his
credibility and demeanor before the fact-finding agency.28
Testing the registrant's sincerity of belief before going on to
the other elements, prevents his mimicking the belief of another to
qualify for an exemption. The test is just as vital when a person
professes belief as a Quaker as it is when a person professes a belief
such as Seeger S.29
The second element, that of validity or correctness of belief, is
beyond the province of any board or court, and is not to be ques-
tioned even though it is beyond comprehension. As justice Douglas
said in United States v. Ballard:30
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the
proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which
are real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. 31
The third element of the registrant's belief, emphasized by the
Court, is the importance of that belief in his life. This is the element
which is measured by the parallel belief test. However, the belief
to be measured by this test is not just any belief which results in
an opposition to war. 2
The parallel belief test is to be applied within the framework
of section 6(j), to provide the Congressional grant of exemption to
persons opposed to war on grounds of religious belief based upon a
Supreme Being.3 The Court pointed out that the parallel belief test
will not be applied to beliefs based on sociological, political, or
economic considerations, since these are expressly excluded by sec-
tion 6(j). Another express exclusion is a belief stemming from a
"merely personal moral code." The meaning of this phrase, "merely
personal moral code" became important in the Seeger case, since
Seeger's beliefs might well be said to stem from such a code. The
Court, in considering this exclusion, applied a rule of construction.
Since Supreme Being had been broadly interpreted, it was held that
28 213 F.2d at 904.
29 Bradley v. United States, 218 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1954), rev'd per curiam,
348 U.S. 967 (1955); United States v. Corliss, 173 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
30 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
31 Id. at 86.
32 Several writers have reached the contrary conclusion by a literal reading of
the words of the test. See, e.g., criticism of Seeger as allowing even an atheist to
qualify for exemption within the parallel belief test in 14 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 238
(1965).
33 380 U.S. at 187, where the court says that Seeger, "professed 'religious belief'
and . . . did not disavow any belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' . . . . In the
light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think
the Board had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted the
exemption."
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any exceptions thereto must be given a narrow interpretation. A
narrow interpretation of the exclusion in question resulted in the
holding that it applies only to a belief that is based on a moral code
which is merely personal, and in no way related to a Supreme Being.
Since Seeger's belief, although perhaps stemming from a personal
moral code, was in some way related to a Supreme Being, it was
not merely personal within the meaning of the exception and it was
entitled to an exemption. 4
Restated, the rule of the Seeger case is: if the registrant's
belief, sincerely held, and professedly -religious, occupies the same
place in his life that an orthodox belief in God does in the life of
a registrant clearly entitled to exemption, it is not based on a "merely
personal moral code," and the registrant deserves an exemption.
35
CONCLUSION
The Seeger decision provides a much needed clarification and
modernization of the term "Supreme Being." However, because of
the strong emphasis placed on the registrant's sincerity, and because
of the newly created parallel belief test, the class of persons eligible
for exemption is not greatly enlarged. The effect of the Seeger deci-
sion is to expand the category of religious belief which qualifies for
exemption on the one hand, and on the other hand to provide a test
intended to limit the grant of exemption to those properly qualified.
The Seeger decision represents no great victory for the Anti-
War Movement. While there are undoubtedly members of the move-
ment whose convictions against war are based on the requisite reli-
gious principles, the bulk of the demonstrators have no particular
religious convictions about war but merely feel that the action of
the United States in Viet Nam is morally wrong. A belief that a
particular war is wrong or a reservation of the right to determine
whether some future war is right or wrong will never be grounds
for an exemption from military service under present law, even
though based on a recognized religious belief.
36
Until Congress sees fit to grant exemption to all pacifists, or
section 6(j) is found unconstitutional, a registrant seeking exemption
as a conscientious objector may expect to be closely examined on
the tenets of his "faith." Under the provisions of the Selective
34 380 U.S. at 186.
35 Ibid. Accord, Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912, 914 (10th Cir. 1965).
Fleming follows Seeger and applies its holding where the registrant was influenced
by religious beliefs, but was more influenced by philosophical beliefs. He was granted
an exemption since his beliefs were not "merely personal."
36 United States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
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